safetext
This is not an officially supported Google product.
Safe-by-construction libraries for producing formats like YAML, to replace
syntax-unaware libraries like text/template
and sprintf
that are at risk of
injection vulnerabilities.
Example use-case
Since text/template
is not syntax-aware of the formats it produces, it does
not offer any protection against injection vulnerabilities.
Consider the following produceConfig
function which uses text/template
to
generate YAML:
package main
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"text/template"
)
func produceConfig(params any) (error, string) {
tmpl, _ := template.New("test").Parse("{ hello: {{ .addressee }} }")
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, params)
if err != nil {
return err, ""
}
return nil, buf.String()
}
func main() {
goodReplacements := map[string]interface{}{
"addressee": "safe",
}
err, config := produceConfig(goodReplacements)
if err == nil {
fmt.Println(config)
} else {
fmt.Printf("Error: %v\n", err)
}
badReplacements := map[string]interface{}{
"addressee": "world, oops: true",
}
err, config = produceConfig(badReplacements)
if err == nil {
fmt.Println(config)
} else {
fmt.Printf("Error: %v\n", err)
}
}
This program demonstrates how a malicious addressee
input can cause injection
of new YAML keys in the template execution result.
With text/template
, no errors will be encountered when this happens, and the
program output will be:
{ hello: safe }
{ hello: world, oops: true }
By instead switching from text/template
to safetext/yamltemplate
, the
injection would have been prevented, with the output instead being:
{ hello: safe }
Error: YAML Injection Detected
Instructions for text/template
replacements
Injection detection is automatically applied when accessing input data fields.
-
It can also be manually enabled on the result of any function call:
{{ RetrieveUntrustedData | ApplyInjectionDetection }}
-
The injection logic can be disabled on certain fields by applying the
StructuralData
annotation:
{{ (StructuralData .x) }}
-
The StructuralData
annotation is also needed when passing an input to a
function where the input should not be mutated, such as a performing some
kind of lookup:
name: {{ readFile (StructuralData .pathToName) | ApplyInjectionDetection }}
-
It is recommended to make full use of text/template
features like
conditional expressions, range loops, etc to avoid the StructuralData
annotation where possible. For example, instead of:
properties:
{{ (StructuralData .PropertiesYaml) }}
Consider:
properties:{{ range .Properties }}
- {{ . }}{{ end }}
yamltemplate
The intention of yamltemplate
is to ensure that by-default none of the strings
in the input data affect the structure of the resultant YAML (just the values).
-
For example, the below template would be compatible with yamltemplate as-is,
whilst automatically preventing any injections from the Name
input:
name: {{.Name}}
-
However, any template nodes that are expected to change the resultant YAML
structure, such as inserting arbitrary YAML config, would need to be
annotated explicitly as StructuralData
:
config: {{ (StructuralData .Config) }}
-
Another case of needing the StructuralData
annotation would be where you
need to include a complete map into the yaml structure. Using
StructuralData
alone may let injections pass through via the key so we
need an extra layer of validation here:
labels:
{{- range $key, $value := .Labels }}
{{ (StructuralData $key | MapKey) }}: {{ $value }}
{{- end }}
```
The corresponding golang side could look like this:
func mapKeyFunc(data any) (string, error) { if v, ok := data.(string); ok {
matched, err := regexp.MatchString(^[a-zA-Z0-9/\-.]+$
, v) if err != nil {
return "", err } if !matched { return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid characters in
the key: %v", v) } return v, nil }
return "", errors.New("invalid input")
} ...
tmp:= template.New("something") tmp.Funcs(map[string]any{"MapKey":
mapKeyFunc}) tmpl := template.Must(tmp.Parse(yamlTemplate)) ```
-
You can combine yamltemplate
with shprintf
. Consider the following
cloud-init yaml template:
---
write_files:
- path: /etc/nginx/refresh.sh
owner: root:root
permissions: 0755 # Don't forget the 0 (you are probably using octal...)
content: |
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
{{ shprintf `curl %s > /tmp/something` .userInput }}
Evaluating this template with safetext/yamltemplate, both shell command and
YAML injections will be prevented.
To do this, you need to setup the golang side like this:
tmp:= addons.WithShsprintf(template.New("something"))
tmpl := template.Must(tmp.Parse(yamlTemplate))
Unsupported use cases for yamltemplate
-
YAML with duplicate keys. Duplicate keys are non-standard YAML, and not
supported by this library. Please refactor your YAML template to remove
duplicate keys. For example:
- project:
members: member-a
members: member-b
To:
- project:
members: member-b
shtemplate
shtemplate
is designed to allow you to generate shell scripts with the
guarantee that none of the input data strings will be able to inject new
commands or flags, without explicit annotation.
-
For example, a template script designed to just print one string will fail
to render if that string injects a new command `./evil`
:
echo "{{ .addressee }}"
-
To explicitly allow an input string to contain new commands not from the
template string, the StructuralData
annotation can be used:
{{ (StructuralData .commands) }}
-
Flags (arguments starting with -
) are also forbidden by-default. For
example, the below template will fail to render if Filename
is
--interactive
:
git add {{ .Filename }}
-
To explicitly allow an input string passed as a command argument to be a
flag, the AllowFlags
annotation can be used:
git add {{ (AllowFlags .FilenameOrGitAddFlag) }}
-
Multiple arguments from a single input string is also forbidden by-default.
This construct should instead be implemented using an array and range
expression:
ls {{ range .Paths }}{{.}} {{end}}
Unsupported use-cases for text/template
replacements
-
Escaping logic outside of the templating system. Instead, you should
annotate the escaping logic into your template (EG: .UntrustedField | escape
).
-
Partial formats. The libraries are designed to be used for generating
complete files. If you generate segments and then concatenate them together,
you should instead move this logic into the templating system itself (using
constructs like if
or range
).
-
Functions with side effects. The libraries work by performing multiple
template executions, so if you register functions that have side effects,
this could cause unexpected behaviour (EG: id: {{ AllocateID }}
).
shsprintf
shsprintf
is designed to allow you to generate shell scripts with the
guarantee that none of the input data strings will be able to inject new
commands or flags regardless of potentially incorrect escaping. See the below
example, which will return the error shsprintf.ErrShInjection
instead of the
script with an injected command:
message := "`whoami`"
result, err := shsprintf.Sprintf("git commit -m %s", message)
shsprintf.Sprintf
adds an error return value compared to fmt.Sprintf
, but
the API is otherwise the same. shsprintf.MustSprintf
is available for cases
where panic is acceptable.
shsprintf
comes with an escaping function that is recommended for use:
message := "`whoami`"
result := shsprintf.MustSprintf("git commit -m %s", shsprintf.EscapeDefaultContext(message))
Unlike with text/template
there are no special annotations. If you need to
pass multiple arguments for example, this should be done by altering the format
string:
files := []any{ "file1", "file2", "file3" }
result, err := shsprintf.Sprintf("cat" + strings.Repeat(" %s", len(files)), files...)