## Documentation ¶

### Overview ¶

Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS #1 and RFC 8017.

RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.

The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS #1 and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to PKCS #1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs should use version 2, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where possible.

Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract interface isn't necessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract over the public key primitive, the PrivateKey type implements the Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.

Operations in this package are implemented using constant-time algorithms, except for GenerateKey, PrivateKey.Precompute, and PrivateKey.Validate. Every other operation only leaks the bit size of the involved values, which all depend on the selected key size.

### Index ¶

- Constants
- Variables
- func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, ...) ([]byte, error)
- func DecryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error)
- func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) error
- func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error)
- func EncryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) ([]byte, error)
- func SignPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) ([]byte, error)
- func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, ...) ([]byte, error)
- func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) error
- func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error
- type CRTValue
- type OAEPOptions
- type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions
- type PSSOptions
- type PrecomputedValues
- type PrivateKey
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(rand io.Reader, ciphertext []byte, opts crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error)
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Precompute()
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, digest []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error)
- func (priv *PrivateKey) Validate() error

- type PublicKey

#### Examples ¶

### Constants ¶

const ( // PSSSaltLengthAuto causes the salt in a PSS signature to be as large // as possible when signing, and to be auto-detected when verifying. PSSSaltLengthAuto = 0 // PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash causes the salt length to equal the length // of the hash used in the signature. PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash = -1 )

### Variables ¶

`var ErrDecryption = errors.New("crypto/rsa: decryption error")`

ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message. It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.

`var ErrMessageTooLong = errors.New("crypto/rsa: message too long for RSA key size")`

ErrMessageTooLong is returned when attempting to encrypt or sign a message which is too large for the size of the key. When using SignPSS, this can also be returned if the size of the salt is too large.

`var ErrVerification = errors.New("crypto/rsa: verification error")`

ErrVerification represents a failure to verify a signature. It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.

### Functions ¶

#### func DecryptOAEP ¶

func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error)

DecryptOAEP decrypts ciphertext using RSA-OAEP.

OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle. Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.

The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be nil.

The label parameter must match the value given when encrypting. See EncryptOAEP for details.

## Example ¶

ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("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") label := []byte("orders") plaintext, err := rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), nil, test2048Key, ciphertext, label) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from decryption: %s\n", err) return } fmt.Printf("Plaintext: %s\n", string(plaintext)) // Remember that encryption only provides confidentiality. The // ciphertext should be signed before authenticity is assumed and, even // then, consider that messages might be reordered.

```
Output:
```

#### func DecryptPKCS1v15 ¶

DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5. The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be nil.

Note that whether this function returns an error or not discloses secret information. If an attacker can cause this function to run repeatedly and learn whether each instance returned an error then they can decrypt and forge signatures as if they had the private key. See DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey for a way of solving this problem.

#### func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey ¶

func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) error

DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5. The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be nil.

DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.

Note that if the session key is too small then it may be possible for an attacker to brute-force it. If they can do that then they can learn whether a random value was used (because it'll be different for the same ciphertext) and thus whether the padding was correct. This also defeats the point of this function. Using at least a 16-byte key will protect against this attack.

This method implements protections against Bleichenbacher chosen ciphertext attacks [0] described in RFC 3218 Section 2.3.2 [1]. While these protections make a Bleichenbacher attack significantly more difficult, the protections are only effective if the rest of the protocol which uses DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey is designed with these considerations in mind. In particular, if any subsequent operations which use the decrypted session key leak any information about the key (e.g. whether it is a static or random key) then the mitigations are defeated. This method must be used extremely carefully, and typically should only be used when absolutely necessary for compatibility with an existing protocol (such as TLS) that is designed with these properties in mind.

- [0] “Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1”, Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology (Crypto '98)
- [1] RFC 3218, Preventing the Million Message Attack on CMS, https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3218.html

## Example ¶

RSA is able to encrypt only a very limited amount of data. In order to encrypt reasonable amounts of data a hybrid scheme is commonly used: RSA is used to encrypt a key for a symmetric primitive like AES-GCM.

Before encrypting, data is “padded” by embedding it in a known structure. This is done for a number of reasons, but the most obvious is to ensure that the value is large enough that the exponentiation is larger than the modulus. (Otherwise it could be decrypted with a square-root.)

In these designs, when using PKCS #1 v1.5, it's vitally important to avoid disclosing whether the received RSA message was well-formed (that is, whether the result of decrypting is a correctly padded message) because this leaks secret information. DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey is designed for this situation and copies the decrypted, symmetric key (if well-formed) in constant-time over a buffer that contains a random key. Thus, if the RSA result isn't well-formed, the implementation uses a random key in constant time.

// The hybrid scheme should use at least a 16-byte symmetric key. Here // we read the random key that will be used if the RSA decryption isn't // well-formed. key := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil { panic("RNG failure") } rsaCiphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("aabbccddeeff") if err := rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(nil, rsaPrivateKey, rsaCiphertext, key); err != nil { // Any errors that result will be “public” – meaning that they // can be determined without any secret information. (For // instance, if the length of key is impossible given the RSA // public key.) fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from RSA decryption: %s\n", err) return } // Given the resulting key, a symmetric scheme can be used to decrypt a // larger ciphertext. block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { panic("aes.NewCipher failed: " + err.Error()) } // Since the key is random, using a fixed nonce is acceptable as the // (key, nonce) pair will still be unique, as required. var zeroNonce [12]byte aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block) if err != nil { panic("cipher.NewGCM failed: " + err.Error()) } ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("00112233445566") plaintext, err := aead.Open(nil, zeroNonce[:], ciphertext, nil) if err != nil { // The RSA ciphertext was badly formed; the decryption will // fail here because the AES-GCM key will be incorrect. fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error decrypting: %s\n", err) return } fmt.Printf("Plaintext: %s\n", string(plaintext))

```
Output:
```

#### func EncryptOAEP ¶

func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error)

EncryptOAEP encrypts the given message with RSA-OAEP.

OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle. Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.

The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext. Most applications should use crypto/rand.Reader as random.

The label parameter may contain arbitrary data that will not be encrypted, but which gives important context to the message. For example, if a given public key is used to encrypt two types of messages then distinct label values could be used to ensure that a ciphertext for one purpose cannot be used for another by an attacker. If not required it can be empty.

The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus twice the hash length, minus a further 2.

## Example ¶

secretMessage := []byte("send reinforcements, we're going to advance") label := []byte("orders") // crypto/rand.Reader is a good source of entropy for randomizing the // encryption function. rng := rand.Reader ciphertext, err := rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rng, &test2048Key.PublicKey, secretMessage, label) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from encryption: %s\n", err) return } // Since encryption is a randomized function, ciphertext will be // different each time. fmt.Printf("Ciphertext: %x\n", ciphertext)

```
Output:
```

#### func EncryptPKCS1v15 ¶

EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5. The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.

The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext. Most applications should use crypto/rand.Reader as random. Note that the returned ciphertext does not depend deterministically on the bytes read from random, and may change between calls and/or between versions.

WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.

#### func SignPKCS1v15 ¶

func SignPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) ([]byte, error)

SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS #1 v1.5. Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't advisable except for interoperability.

The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be nil.

This function is deterministic. Thus, if the set of possible messages is small, an attacker may be able to build a map from messages to signatures and identify the signed messages. As ever, signatures provide authenticity, not confidentiality.

## Example ¶

message := []byte("message to be signed") // Only small messages can be signed directly; thus the hash of a // message, rather than the message itself, is signed. This requires // that the hash function be collision resistant. SHA-256 is the // least-strong hash function that should be used for this at the time // of writing (2016). hashed := sha256.Sum256(message) signature, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:]) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from signing: %s\n", err) return } fmt.Printf("Signature: %x\n", signature)

```
Output:
```

#### func SignPSS ¶ added in go1.2

func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error)

SignPSS calculates the signature of digest using PSS.

digest must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are used. If opts.Hash is set, it overrides hash.

The signature is randomized depending on the message, key, and salt size, using bytes from rand. Most applications should use crypto/rand.Reader as rand.

#### func VerifyPKCS1v15 ¶

VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 signature. hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This isn't advisable except for interoperability.

## Example ¶

message := []byte("message to be signed") signature, _ := hex.DecodeString("ad2766728615cc7a746cc553916380ca7bfa4f8983b990913bc69eb0556539a350ff0f8fe65ddfd3ebe91fe1c299c2fac135bc8c61e26be44ee259f2f80c1530") // Only small messages can be signed directly; thus the hash of a // message, rather than the message itself, is signed. This requires // that the hash function be collision resistant. SHA-256 is the // least-strong hash function that should be used for this at the time // of writing (2016). hashed := sha256.Sum256(message) err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], signature) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from verification: %s\n", err) return } // signature is a valid signature of message from the public key.

```
Output:
```

#### func VerifyPSS ¶ added in go1.2

VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.

A valid signature is indicated by returning a nil error. digest must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are used. opts.Hash is ignored.

### Types ¶

#### type CRTValue ¶

type CRTValue struct { Exp *big.Int // D mod (prime-1). Coeff *big.Int // R·Coeff ≡ 1 mod Prime. R *big.Int // product of primes prior to this (inc p and q). }

CRTValue contains the precomputed Chinese remainder theorem values.

#### type OAEPOptions ¶ added in go1.5

type OAEPOptions struct { // Hash is the hash function that will be used when generating the mask. Hash crypto.Hash // MGFHash is the hash function used for MGF1. // If zero, Hash is used instead. MGFHash crypto.Hash // Label is an arbitrary byte string that must be equal to the value // used when encrypting. Label []byte }

OAEPOptions is an interface for passing options to OAEP decryption using the crypto.Decrypter interface.

#### type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions ¶ added in go1.5

type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions struct { // SessionKeyLen is the length of the session key that is being // decrypted. If not zero, then a padding error during decryption will // cause a random plaintext of this length to be returned rather than // an error. These alternatives happen in constant time. SessionKeyLen int }

PKCS1v15DecryptOptions is for passing options to PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption using the crypto.Decrypter interface.

#### type PSSOptions ¶ added in go1.2

type PSSOptions struct { // SaltLength controls the length of the salt used in the PSS signature. It // can either be a positive number of bytes, or one of the special // PSSSaltLength constants. SaltLength int // Hash is the hash function used to generate the message digest. If not // zero, it overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS. It's required // when using PrivateKey.Sign. Hash crypto.Hash }

PSSOptions contains options for creating and verifying PSS signatures.

#### func (*PSSOptions) HashFunc ¶ added in go1.4

func (opts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash

HashFunc returns opts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements crypto.SignerOpts.

#### type PrecomputedValues ¶

```
type PrecomputedValues struct {
Dp, Dq *big.Int // D mod (P-1) (or mod Q-1)
Qinv *big.Int // Q^-1 mod P
// CRTValues is used for the 3rd and subsequent primes. Due to a
// historical accident, the CRT for the first two primes is handled
// differently in PKCS #1 and interoperability is sufficiently
// important that we mirror this.
//
// Deprecated: These values are still filled in by Precompute for
// backwards compatibility but are not used. Multi-prime RSA is very rare,
// and is implemented by this package without CRT optimizations to limit
// complexity.
CRTValues []CRTValue
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
```

#### type PrivateKey ¶

type PrivateKey struct { PublicKey // public part. D *big.Int // private exponent Primes []*big.Int // prime factors of N, has >= 2 elements. // Precomputed contains precomputed values that speed up RSA operations, // if available. It must be generated by calling PrivateKey.Precompute and // must not be modified. Precomputed PrecomputedValues }

A PrivateKey represents an RSA key

#### func GenerateKey ¶

func GenerateKey(random io.Reader, bits int) (*PrivateKey, error)

GenerateKey generates a random RSA private key of the given bit size.

Most applications should use crypto/rand.Reader as rand. Note that the returned key does not depend deterministically on the bytes read from rand, and may change between calls and/or between versions.

##
####
func GenerateMultiPrimeKey
deprecated

GenerateMultiPrimeKey generates a multi-prime RSA keypair of the given bit size and the given random source.

Table 1 in "On the Security of Multi-prime RSA" suggests maximum numbers of primes for a given bit size.

Although the public keys are compatible (actually, indistinguishable) from the 2-prime case, the private keys are not. Thus it may not be possible to export multi-prime private keys in certain formats or to subsequently import them into other code.

This package does not implement CRT optimizations for multi-prime RSA, so the keys with more than two primes will have worse performance.

Deprecated: The use of this function with a number of primes different from two is not recommended for the above security, compatibility, and performance reasons. Use GenerateKey instead.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Decrypt ¶ added in go1.5

func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(rand io.Reader, ciphertext []byte, opts crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error)

Decrypt decrypts ciphertext with priv. If opts is nil or of type *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions then PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption is performed. Otherwise opts must have type *OAEPOptions and OAEP decryption is done.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Equal ¶ added in go1.15

func (priv *PrivateKey) Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool

Equal reports whether priv and x have equivalent values. It ignores Precomputed values.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Precompute ¶

func (priv *PrivateKey) Precompute()

Precompute performs some calculations that speed up private key operations in the future.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Public ¶ added in go1.4

func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey

Public returns the public key corresponding to priv.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Sign ¶ added in go1.4

func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, digest []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error)

Sign signs digest with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS #1 v1.5 will be used. digest must be the result of hashing the input message using opts.HashFunc().

This method implements crypto.Signer, which is an interface to support keys where the private part is kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common uses should use the Sign* functions in this package directly.

#### func (*PrivateKey) Validate ¶

func (priv *PrivateKey) Validate() error

Validate performs basic sanity checks on the key. It returns nil if the key is valid, or else an error describing a problem.